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Abstract 
 
Efforts to modernize the political, foreign and military affairs of the Habsburg 
Monarchy were begun in 1906, in order to counter the perceived weaknesses of 
the Habsburg state. The effects of these reforms, both intentional and 
unintentional, would serve to push the „BalkaŶ QuestioŶ” into a prominent 
position in European Great Power diplomacy from 1906-1914.  
Keywords: Habsburg Dual Monarchy, Balkans, diplomacy, Francis Ferdinand, 
Alois Leǆa ǀoŶ AehƌeŶthal, FƌaŶz CoŶƌad ǀoŶ HötzeŶdoƌf 
 
At the beginning of the 20th century, the Habsburg Dual Monarchy was either 
allied to, or had cordial relations with, all of its neighbors. Imperial Germany and 
Austria-Hungary had been tied together in the Dual Alliance since 1879, which 
became the Triple Alliance with the addition of the Kingdom of Italy in 1882. A 
secret treaty with Romania had made that country an unofficial member of the 
alliance in 1883. Serbia, under the rule of the Obrenovic dynasty, had pursued a 
pro-Habsburg policy since 1878, which had essentially turned Serbia into a de facto 
Habsburg satellite.1 The mercurial Prince Nikita of Montenegro was a bit less 
predictable, but the fact that his tiny principality was almost entirely surrounded 
by Habsburg territory generally guaranteed his falling in line with Habsburg policy 
on most issues, in spite of the fact that he had married his daughters to the king of 
Italy and a pair of Russian archdukes.2 The old enmity between the Habsburgs and 
the Ottomans had died out during the 19th century, to be replaced with a desire on 
the part of Austria-Hungary that the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire in 
Europe be maintained as a check against Balkan nationalist aspirations. Tsarist 
Russia was preoccupied with its expansion in the Far East, and was mostly 
interested in maintaining amicable relations on its western frontiers.  
By 1916, the Habsburg Monarchy was at war with all of her neighbors with the 
exception of Germany (the Ottoman Empire had ceased being a neighbor of 
Austria-Hungary since the conclusion of the First Balkan War in 1912). How was it 
that such a dramatic change in circumstances could come about in such a 
relatively short time span? A key to answering that question may lie in the rise to 
prominence of three individuals within the Habsburg policy making process in 
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1906. These three men shared a common vision of a strong, unified and above all 
modernized Habsburg state, with an effective army and an independent foreign 
policy which would serve the purpose of maintaining the Great Power status of the 
Monarchy. Archduke Francis Ferdinand, nephew and heir apparent to the 
Habsburg Emperor-King Francis Joseph, Count Alois Lexa von Aehrenthal and 
GeŶeƌal FƌaŶz CoŶƌad ǀoŶ HötzeŶdoƌf, ŵade up this tƌiuŵǀiƌate of ƌefoƌŵeƌs ǁho 
wished to renovate the Habsburg Monarchy from an historical anachronism into a 
more modern state.  In so doing, they each pursued their own adaptation of that 
vision, which ultimately proved unobtainable. The actions they took, and the 
policies they pursued, helped lead to the situation in which the Habsburg 
Monarchy found itself surrounded and nearly friendless, and ultimately to the 
destruction of the state they had sought to preserve. 
Some have described the Habsburg Monarchy as „having not a government but 
a diplomatic service that also administered,”3 while others have called it „an 
orgaŶizatioŶ for ĐoŶduĐtiŶg foreigŶ poliĐy.”4 The unique nature of the Habsburg 
state in the early 20th century illustrates the reality behind these observations. 
Since 1867, the Habsburg Monarchy had actually been two states, each with its 
own parliament and each having (at least theoretically) complete jurisdiction over 
purely internal matters. The only joint enterprises of Austria and Hungary were the 
foreign office and the ͚Iŵperial aŶd ‘oyal͛ Army, both of which were beyond the 
jurisdiction of the parliaments and under the sole purview of the Emperor-King 
himself. However, the preoccupation of the Habsburg Monarchy with diplomatic 
affairs was already long established by 1867.   
As a polyglot, multi-national, multi-confessional state, the Monarchy acquired 
its legitimacy not through the consent of the governed, or as a vehicle for the 
aspirations of any particular nation of people, but solely through the notion that 
the other states of the world, and particularly the other Great Powers, recognized 
its legitimacy by engaging in diplomacy with it. This had been true since at least 
1720, when Charles VI promulgated the ͚PragŵatiĐ SaŶĐtioŶ͛ in an attempt to get 
not only the disparate peoples of his realms, but also the sovereigns of Europe to 
recognize the unity of the Habsburg lands.5  
The diplomatic maneuverings of post-Napoleonic Europe were dominated by 
the Habsburg Chancellor and Foreign Minister Prince Klemens Wenzel von 
Metternich, who held his post from 1809 until the revolutions of 1848 finally 
swept him away. The foreign policy of Metternich was focused on the 
maintenance of the peace of the Congress of Vienna, which sought to uphold the 
legitimacy of absolutist rule in the face of assaults by both liberal and radical 
elements. This led him to make common cause with the other autocratic states of 
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Europe, most notably Russia and Prussia, in the so-called Holy Alliance. The 
dividends from this partnership paid out even after the departure of Metternich 
from the scene, as the intervention of a Russian army against the Hungarians in 
1849 sealed the fate of Lajos Kossuth͛s atteŵpt to estaďlish an independent 
Magyar nation-state.6   
Unfortunately, this might be seen as the highpoint of Habsburg diplomacy, as a 
long series of setbacks and defeats, both diplomatic and military, followed over 
the next 60 years. The failure of the Habsburgs to support Russia during the 
Crimean War caused a serious rupture in the previously close relationship. Failures 
of diplomacy led to defeats on the battle field against France in 1859 and Prussia 
in 1866. The Prussian Chancellor Otto von BisŵaƌĐk͛s magnanimity towards the 
Habsburgs after 1866 allowed a quick rapprochement with Prussia-Germany, but it 
became increasingly clear that the Habsburgs were considered the junior partner 
in the arrangement.   
A revival of the Holy Alliance seemed on offer with BisŵaƌĐk͛s Thƌee Eŵpeƌoƌ͛s 
League amongst Germany, Russia and Austria-Hungary, but the ambitions of the 
new German Kaiser allowed the treaty to lapse.  From the loss of territory suffered 
in the wars of 1859 and 1866, to the loss of prestige and influence suffered by 
becoming increasingly dependent on the German alliance, at the turn of the 20th 
century there were many, even within the Habsburg Monarchy, who would have 
agreed with the Italian ambassador in Vienna when he noted that „Austria follows 
a policy of complete effaĐeŵeŶt.”7   
In the Habsburg realms this led to an adoption of a fatalistic attitude among 
some that the days of the Monarchy were numbered. Among others, there arose a 
determination to reverse the tide, or at least to go out with a bang instead of a 
whimper. Foremost amongst the latter were numbered Francis Ferdinand, 
Aehrenthal and Conrad.  There were a great many obstacles in the way of instilling 
a sense of renewed vitality and re-establishing the Monarchy as an independent 
agent on the Great Power level, most of which stemmed from the structure of the 
state itself. 
In the Habsburg Monarchy, the ideas of Innenpolitik (domestic politics) and 
AußeŶpolitik (foreign affairs) were intertwined as nowhere else in Europe. This 
was due as much to the unique internal structure of the Dual Monarchy as to the 
multi-national nature of the state. Since the Compromise of 1867, (German: 
Ausgleich, Hungarian: kiegyezés) the Habsburg Monarchy had been recognized as 
consisting of two separate constitutional realms, with a sovereign (and very little 
else) in common. Even the title of the sovereign was in dispute, as Francis Joseph 
was Emperor only of the non-Hungarian parts of his realm; within Hungary he was 
only referred to as king, to do otherwise was to invite a charge of treason.   
In practice, therefore, the Habsburg Monarchy operated on three different 
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levels. The ͚ĐoŵŵoŶ ŵoŶarĐhy͛ represented Habsburg interests to the rest of the 
world, and consisted of the Emperor-King, the Foreign Ministry and the War 
Ministry. A common customs union between Austria and Hungary regulated the 
economic affairs of the Monarchy, and by the terms of the Compromise was 
subject to renewal (and renegotiation) every ten years. Finally, there were the two 
separate constitutional states of Austria8 and Hungary, each with their own 
parliaments and full control over all strictly internal matters.9 Each state also had 
its oǁŶ aƌŵed foƌĐes that ǁeƌe distiŶĐt fƌoŵ the ͚Iŵpeƌial aŶd ‘oǇal͛ ;kaiserliche 
uŶd köŶigsliĐhe, or k.u.k) ͚CoŵŵoŶ Army͛, the Austrian Landwehr and the 
Hungarian HoŶǀéd. All matters of joint interest were negotiated by the 
͚DelegatioŶs͛, selected by each of the parliamentary bodies as their 
representatives to the common Monarchy. Due mainly to Hungarian wishes that 
there be no hints of an ͚Iŵperial ParliaŵeŶt͛, the delegations always sat 
separately, and negotiated directly with the Minister concerned rather than with 
each other.10  
The nature of the two states of the Monarchy also provided sources of friction 
and instability, both internally and externally. The Kingdom of Hungary had been 
an historical state from the time of its founding under the Áƌpád dǇŶastǇ iŶ the 
year 1000. It had maintained a geographical continuity within its established 
borders since at least the 13th century, and had passed into the Habsburg domains 
by election of its nobility after the death of the Jagiellonian King Louis II following 
the ďattle of MoháĐs iŶ ϭϱϮϲ. The stipulatioŶs uŶdeƌ ǁhiĐh FeƌdiŶaŶd, ďƌotheƌ of 
the Holy Roman Emperor Charles V, assumed the throne of Hungary included the 
recognition of the territorial integrity of the ͚LaŶds of the HuŶgariaŶ CroǁŶ͛, and 
the recognition of the rights and privileges of the Hungarian nobility. With the 
exception of the reign of Joseph II, who attempted to fashion the disparate parts 
of his inheritance into a unified, Enlightened state, and the period between the 
suppƌessioŶ of Kossuth͛s HuŶgaƌiaŶ ‘epuďliĐ iŶ ϭϴϰϵ aŶd the Coŵpƌoŵise of ϭϴϲϳ, 
both the territorial integrity of the historic Kingdom of Hungary and the 
acknowledgement, often grudgingly given, of a Magyar political nation, was part of 
the coronation oath of every Habsburg ruler from Ferdinand up to the end of the 
dynasty.  
By the early 20th century, the Kingdom of Hungary made up the largest part of 
the Habsburg Monarchy, and about 40% of its population.11 Although it was a 
multi-national state within the multi-national Monarchy, ethno-linguistic Magyars 
                                                             
8 To be precise, the use of the term ͚Austria͛ to refer to the non-Hungarian part of the Monarchy is 
an anachronism prior to 1915. The official title of that entity was ͚the lands and kingdoms represented 
iŶ the ‘eiĐhsrat͛. For reasons of clarity and brevity, the term ͚Austria͛ will be used to refer to that part 
of the Habsburg Monarchy that was not Hungary, or after 1908 neither Hungary nor Bosnia. 
9 TAYLOR (1990): 146. 
10 Éǀa SOMOGYI:The Political System of Dualism, IN: AŶdƌás GE‘Ő ;ed.Ϳ: The Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy Revisited, Columbia University Press, New York, 2009. 142. 
11 John C SWANSON: The Body of the Empire, IN: Zsuzsa GÁSPÁ‘ ;ed.Ϳ: The Austro-Hungarian Dual 
Monarchy (1867-1918), New Holland, London, 2008. 41. 
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made up a clear majority of 54% of its population.12  When taken together with the 
restriction placed on the franchise (about 6% of the population was eligible to 
vote) this Magyar majority translated into an absolute Magyar domination of the 
political life of the Hungarian state. The Nationalities Act of 1868 had set the 
official acknowledgement of the right of non-Magyars to use their own language, 
but was adamant in asserting that there was but one, unitary political state to be 
found within the kingdom.  By the early 20th century, this had been interpreted to 
mean that individuals had various cultural and linguistic rights, but no collective 
political rights separate from the one, unitary Hungarian political state. 
In contrast, the Austrian part of the Monarchy had no dominant political or 
linguistic majority, with Germans (35%) and Czechs (23%), being the two most 
populous groups.13 Spatially, the Austrian lands were „a geographic nonsense,”14 
in that they were a hodgepodge of feudal dynastic holdings acquired through 
several centuries of Habsburg diplomacy, marriage, conquest or inheritance that 
lacked any unifying theme. The greater diversity of nationalities within the 
Austrian state, along with a much broader franchise (27% of the population were 
originally eligible to vote, which was expanded to universal adult male suffrage in 
1907), provided for a much more contentious and divisive political life.  No 
nationality or political party could gain predominance, with even the socialists 
splitting into separate Czech and German parties.15 
While this led to greater internal instability in Austria, as both the Germans and 
Czechs used obstructionist tactics to periodically render the Reichsrat unworkable as 
a legislative and governing body, it did manage to make things easier for the 
Emperor and his Ministers. For one, the wide range of nationalities, each further 
splintered into discrete political parties, guaranteed a hung parliament every 
election, allowing Francis Joseph to pick the Austrian Minister-President from among 
his own choices.16 In addition, Paragraph 14 of the Basic Law of Representation 
which governed the activity of the Reichsrat allowed the Minister-President to 
essentially rule by fiat until such time as the legislature could come to order.17  
The complications for Habsburg foreign policy which arose from its unique 
composition were manifold. First and foremost, the agreement, or at least 
compliance, of the two constitutional states would have to be acquired for any 
major diplomatic or military action. While the structure of Dualism left the fields of 
military and foreign affairs to the sole discretion of the Emperor-King and his 
                                                             
12 László KATUS: Hungary in the Dual Monarchy, 1867-1914, Columbia University Press, New York, 
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13 TAYLOR (1990:) 286. 
14 Ibid, 284. 
15 Catherine ALBRECHT: The Bohemian Question, IN: Mark CORNWALL (ed.): The Last Years of 
Austria Hungary: a Multi-national Experiment in Early Twentieth-century Europe, University of Exeter 
Press, Exeter, 2002. 83. 
16 Lothar HÖBELT: Well-tempered Discontent: Austrian Domestic Politics, IN: CORNWALL (2002): 48. 
17 Samuel R. WILLIAMSON, Jr.: Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War, Palgrave 
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ministers, in practice nothing could be done without the acquiescence of the two 
parliaments, or at least the Minister-Presidents. While this was generally a pro 
forma exercise in the case of the Austrians, it was anything but that with the 
Hungarians.  The principal aim of the Hungarian government was the continued 
integrity of the Lands of the Holy Crown of St. Stephen, and the maintenance of 
the one and indivisible Hungarian political nation. To that end, while Hungary was 
not prepared to give up any of her Slav or Romanian subjects (or, to probably be 
more precise, they were unwilling to part with the ground they stood on), they 
had no desire at all to increase the number of Slavs within the Monarchy either.  
Another possible complication for the foreign policy makers of the Monarchy 
was their inability to directly influence strictly internal matters within each of the 
constituent parts of the Monarchy. In a state where there were 11 different 
nationalities, at least 5 of whom had national states to which they could 
conceivably become ͚ŵagŶetized͛, strictly internal policies could have 
international repercussions. Internal laws, such as the Hungarian education law of 
1907, which made the teaching of Hungarian compulsory among all ethnic groups, 
caused tensions with the ethnic Romanians of the Monarchy.18  The status of the 
ethnic Romanians in Hungary was an issue which Romania felt compelled to 
remark on, and was then a source of tension between Romania and the Monarchy. 
However, the apparatus of the ͚ĐoŵŵoŶ ŵoŶarĐhy͛ had very little power to 
influence the internal education policies of the Kingdom of Hungary.  Perhaps it is 
understandable that as the nationalities issue became more of a concern in the 
last decade of the 19th century, Habsburg foreign policy had taken on the 
appearance of muddle and inaction.   
Habsburg diplomatic fortunes in the 20th century seemed to be continuing in 
the same direction, as relations with Serbia began to worsen. Serbia had been an 
economic and political dependency of Austria-Hungary since at least 1878, and the 
Austrophile King Milan had urged his son to take a German princess as a bride in 
oƌdeƌ to seal Seƌďia͛s plaĐe ǁithiŶ the Tƌiple AlliaŶĐe Đaŵp. Theƌe ǁeƌe eǀeŶ soŵe 
elements within the Serbian intelligentsia in the late 19th century which were 
sympathetic to the idea of a merger of Serbia and the other Balkan states into a 
federalized Habsburg Monarchy.19   
With the death of Milan in 1901, Habsburg influence on Serbia began to 
weaken.  His son Alexander ƌejeĐted ďoth his fatheƌ͛s ǁish to take a GeƌŵaŶ ďƌide, 
and those of many of his Russophile army officers to make a match that would tie 
the kingdom closer to the Romanov dynasty. Instead he made Draga Masin, a 
commoner as well as a widow with an extremely colorful past, his wife and queen. 
This scandalous union was the cause of much debate in Serbia, especially among 
the small but growing number of nationalist army officers. Rumors of an 
impending coup d͛état in favor of the pro-Russian Karadjeordjevic prince Peter 
were finally proven true in 1903. What was originally supposed to be a clandestine 
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coup with the connivance of some of the palace guard turned into a bloodbath, as 
the royal guard was slaughtered, and the naked bodies of King Alexander and 
Queen Draga were hacked by sabers and then thrown from the royal apartments 
into the courtyard. 
The overthrow of their client in Serbia and its replacement with a pro-Russian, 
pan-Slav dynasty, not to mention the brutal savagery with which the coup had 
been carried out, made a deep impression on those responsible for the foreign 
and military affairs of the Monarchy. When the Karadjordjevic king and his 
government showed a propensity for encouraging Serbian nationalist sentiment, 
the Habsburgs applied the tool that had been able to keep Serbia under control 
siŶĐe the ϭϴϳϬ͛s; ŶaŵelǇ, eĐoŶoŵiĐ pƌessuƌe.   
As a landlocked country completely surrounded by the territory of the Ottoman 
Eŵpiƌe aŶd the Haďsďuƌg MoŶaƌĐhǇ, Seƌďia͛s eĐoŶoŵiĐ life had ďeeŶ alŵost 
completely dependent on Austria-Hungary since its independence from direct 
Ottoman rule. Serbian industry, such as it was, was quite basic, and its main export 
commodity was livestock, particularly pigs. In Serbia, Austro-Hungarian industries 
had one of its few direct external markets.  After 1903, Serb nationalists demanded 
that Serbia simultaneously protect their own fledgling industries against Austrian 
dominance, and to expand the range of economic relationships with other countries.  
When the Serbian government placed a contract for new artillery guns with the 
French firm of Schneider-Creusot, rejecting the Austrian Skoda bid, the Habsburgs 
proclaimed an embargo of Serbian goods, unleashing the so-called ͚Pig War͛, in 
1906. This economic conflict became a humiliating defeat for the Habsburgs, as 
Serbia not only increased its exports and GDP during every year of the ͚ǁar͛, but the 
vacuum left by the exclusion of Austro-Hungarian capital and products from Serbia 
was more than compensated for by the influx of French, Russian and, most 
disturbingly from the Habsburg point of view, German money and goods.20 The 
strengthening of the Serbian nationalist party, as well as the doubts cast on the 
reliability of Germany as an ally in regards to Serbia in future, provided further proof 
of the Habsburg slide into decline, or so it seemed to many observers at the time. 
A combination of internal and external pressures in 1905 and 1906 had some 
contemporary outside observers forecasting the dissolution of the Dual Monarchy 
itself.21 This provided the impetus for a profound change in the course of Habsburg 
diplomatic orientation. The failure to bend Serbia to the Habsburg yoke, coupled 
with the humiliation felt in Habsburg military and diplomatic circles over the 
obsequious role they played during the Algeciras conference in 1905, awoke them 
to the dangers posed by an increasing dependency on the alliance with Germany. 
The prospect of being dragged into a general European war over some peccadillo 
of the German Emperor, who had sought to praise Austria-HuŶgaƌǇ as GeƌŵaŶǇ͛s 
„ďrilliaŶt seĐoŶd” at the conference,22 ŵade it Đleaƌ that the Haďsďuƌg MoŶaƌĐhǇ͛s 
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continued status as a Great Power and an independent actor in European 
diplomatic affairs were at issue. 
The domestic troubles of the Monarchy in 1905-06 would also end up having a 
lasting impact on its foreign affairs. In Hungary, the Magyar nationalist 
Independence Party (generally anti-Compromise) defeated IstváŶ Tisza͛s Liberal 
Party (pro-Compromise) in the elections of 1905, thus ousting the Liberals from 
power for the first time since the establishment of the Dual Monarchy in 1867.23 
The new Hungarian government immediately challenged the constitutional order 
by seeking to interfere iŶ oŶe of the kiŶg͛s aƌeas of sole juƌisdiction, the military.  
The Hungarian parliament wished to make the funds paid to the common war 
treasury, and the sending of its share of recruits, contingent upon the use of 
Hungarian as the language of command used in all regiments of the common army 
raised in Hungary.   
Francis Joseph had always been scrupulous in abiding by the terms of the 
Compromise, and had never interfered in the internal affairs of his Hungarian 
lands; thus he was indignant that his parliament in Budapest had attempted to 
force its will on an area of his royal prerogative. When the Hungarian government 
proved intransigent to negotiation, Francis Joseph suspended the constitution and 
cleared the parliament building with the aid of a battalion of the k.u.k. Armee. 
After fifteen months of martial law, Francis Joseph was finally able to restore 
constitutional rule with the return of Tisza to power, although not yet to the 
premiership. 
The strain of the problems in Hungary, coupled with serious health problems, 
took its toll on the aged Francis Joseph. From 1906, he began to involve the heir 
presumptive, his nephew Francis Ferdinand, more directly in the policy making 
process.  In the main, this involvement was of an informal, unofficial nature. The 
power of the sovereign remained irreducible, and with him remained the sole 
power of decision in matters of war and peace. The one area of official power 
bestowed on Francis Ferdinand was the establishment of a military chancery in the 
Belvedere Palace, the Vienna residence of the heir apparent. From this growing 
center of power, Francis Ferdinand was to exert an increasing influence on military 
affairs, chiefly in the areas of modernization of tactics and equipment.   
Even though his official influence was not considerable in the Habsburg state 
apparatus in general, his unofficial influence waxed and waned according to 
circumstances.  His direct influence on the Emperor-King was slight, as Francis 
Joseph disliked his nephew intensely.  He had never forgiven Francis Ferdinand for 
insisting on marrying the Bohemian Countess Sophie Chotek, who Francis Joseph 
viewed as occupying too low a social station to be consort to the future Habsburg 
ruler. Etiquette required that only a fellow Habsburg or a member of one of the 
other significant royal houses of Europe would be a suitable spouse for the heir 
apparent (Francis Joseph himself had married his own first cousin).24   
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The adamant refusal to allow the marriage by Francis Joseph was met by the 
equally adamant refusal to consider another spouse on the part of Francis 
Ferdinand.25  The impasse had threatened the continuity of the Monarchy, and it 
took the personal intervention of Kaiser Wilhelm, Tsar Nicholas and Pope Leo XIII 
to persuade the Emperor-King to permit the marriage. The conditions under which 
he permitted the marriage were to cause lasting resentment in Francis Ferdinand. 
The most egregiously offensive was the stipulation that the marriage be 
morganatic (i.e. the offspring of the union were barred from the line of 
succession). 
Although his personal influence with Francis Joseph was slight, Francis 
Ferdinand did manage to be more successful in another form of influence; namely 
in getting many of his choices for key military and diplomatic positions put into 
place.  The pinnacle of his success in this field was in influencing the appointment 
of Aerenthal as the Habsburg Foreign Minister in October, 1906, and getting 
Conrad appointed Chief of the General Staff the following month. Although both 
men may be fairly called protégés of Francis Ferdinand, they were definitely not 
his creatures. Each man, upon assuming his post, felt that he owed his allegiance 
first and foremost to the Monarchy as an institution, not to any one particular 
man. For his part, Francis Ferdinand did not appear to attempt to play the part of 
puppet master.   
Each of the three men sought to secure the future of the Monarchy by the 
talents available to them. Ultimately, beginning from a point of general 
commonality in 1906, the three men followed different paths, which ultimately led 
to a divergence of opinions on the best way to secure the future continuity of the 
Monarchy.  By July, 1914, two of the men were dead, and the third was able to see 
his vision implemented in full, to the ultimate destruction of that which he had 
sought to preserve.    
Francis Ferdinand, as heir to the throne had the most potential, and the least 
actual, power of the three. In a state where the sitting monarch had reigned since 
1848, and had already outlived his brothers, son and wife, most of the Habsburg 
officials realized that Francis Ferdinand was the future of the Monarchy, and that 
the future was fast approaching. Thus, his views were considered and his voice 
increasingly heard in the affairs of the Monarchy, and the military chancery at the 
Belvedere took on the appearance of a sort of shadow government 
Francis Ferdinand was known to favor an internal reform of the Dual 
Monarchy, in order to preserve its Great Power status and independent role in 
European affairs. The exact shape of those reforms was left, probably 
purposefully, vague.  His antipathy towards Hungary and the Hungarians was well 
known, and he was recognized as having a personal aŶiŵus toǁaƌds IstǀáŶ Tisza, 
whom Francis Ferdinand regarded as „the most dangerous man in the 
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MoŶarĐhy.”26 Ironically Tisza was as much a supporter of the Monarchy as the 
Crown Prince, but in the case of the former he thought that the future unity of the 
Habsburg dynasty required that its center of gravity move more towards 
Budapest,27 while Francis Ferdinand believed that the centralization of power and 
the elimination of Magyar influence was essential for the Monarchy to become a 
modern state.   
Exactly what plans Francis Ferdinand had in mind for the future of the 
Monarchy are not known, but he gave off a few hints of his intentions.  He was 
rumored to be in favor of a ͚Trialist͛ solutioŶ to the MoŶaƌĐhǇ͛s South Slaǀ 
question, which alarmed both the Hungarians and Serbian nationalists. A third, 
South Slav political nation to be formed within the Monarchy would rob Hungary 
of both political influence and territory, as the majority of the South Slavs of the 
Monarchy, outside of Bosnia, lived in Southern Hungary and Croatia. Additionally, 
if the South Slavs within the Monarchy became reconciled to working within the 
state, Serbia would be cut off from the dream of both Greater Serbia and 
Yugoslaǀia. GiǀeŶ that FƌaŶĐis FeƌdiŶaŶd͛s oǀeƌall goal ǁas to iŶĐƌease the poǁeƌ 
and prestige of the Monarchy, it seems counterintuitive that he would truly pursue 
a policy of permanent Trialism. It could be that he only used this as a way to 
frighten the Hungarians into a more acceptable frame of mind, or that he may 
have intended Trialism to be a step in the direction of a federal Monarchy. The 
idea of a ͚DaŶuďiaŶ CoŶfedeƌatioŶ of NatioŶs͛ had pƌeĐedeŶĐe at least as faƌ ďaĐk 
as Kossuth͛s pƌoĐlaŵatioŶ ƌegaƌdiŶg the autoŶoŵǇ aŶd eƋualitǇ of ŶatioŶalities 
within Hungary in 1849.28 Whatever his ultimate plans were, Francis Ferdinand 
was an unwavering advocate of peaceful means in resolving the various crises 
which assailed the Monarchy between 1906 and 1914. His long term view was that 
the Monarchy needed to reform from within in order to survive as a modern state, 
and that peace was an essential prerequisite for the domestic reforms to be 
implemented.  
The ŵaŶ desigŶated to ƌeǀeƌse the MoŶaƌĐhǇ͛s diploŵatiĐ toƌpiditǇ aŶd 
restore its international standing was Count Alois Lexa von Aehrenthal.  Described 
by one historian as „the ŵost respeĐted foreigŶ ŵiŶister of the day,”29 and by 
another as „arrogaŶt, ǀaiŶ, iŵpatieŶt aŶd eager for aĐtioŶ,”30 Aehrenthal sought 
to restore vigor and independence to the foreign policy of the Monarchy, and to 
that end sought to come to a modus vivendi with Russia in the Balkans. He 
recognized that if Austria-Hungary were to have any chance of discarding its role 
as GeƌŵaŶǇ͛s „ďrilliaŶt seĐoŶd,” then cordial relations with Russia were essential.   
As a long serving ambassador to St. Petersburg, Aehrenthal had come to the 
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conclusion a decade earlier that the key to gainiŶg ‘ussia͛s paƌtŶeƌship iŶ BalkaŶ 
affairs was the question of Russian access to the Turkish Straits.31 AehƌeŶthal͛s 
self-confidence and his intimate knowledge of Russian affairs led him to begin 
laying the groundwork for what was to be his master stroke of international 
diplomacy from the moment he assumed his office in the Ballhausplatz. This was 
to take the form of a quid pro quo arrangement with Russia involving the 
annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary, and the opening of the 
Turkish Straits for Russian warships.  
With this plaŶ, AehƌeŶthal hoped to addƌess seǀeƌal of the MoŶaƌĐhǇ͛s pƌoďleŵs 
in a single issue.  The proposed agreement between Russia and Austria-Hungary to 
ƌeĐogŶize eaĐh otheƌ͛s legitiŵate spheƌes of iŶflueŶĐe iŶ the BalkaŶs ǁould 
simultaneously lessen tensions in the area and increase the degree of independence 
the Monarchy could exercise in regards to the German alliance. Additionally, the 
acquisition of Bosnia-Herzegovina would eliminate those provinces from being 
absorbed into a Greater Serbia, thus thwarting the expansion of Serbian and South 
Slav nationalism in the direction of the Monarchy. Tangentially, the Bosnian 
territories were not to be absorbed into either of the constitutional states of the 
Monarchy, but governed diƌeĐtlǇ ďǇ the ͚ĐoŵŵoŶ ŵoŶaƌĐhǇ͛.  This Đould ďe seeŶ as 
an opportunity to defuse South Slav nationalism within the Monarchy by highlighting 
the ability of the Habsburgs to give justice and equity to the Slavs who were not 
under the domination of the Magyar nation.  Ultimately, success in the realm of 
foreign policy was supposed to lead to a rejuvenation of society as a whole, by giving 
the inhabitants of the Monarchy a sense that the state had a future, and was not 
bound inexorably for the ash-heap of history.   
In addition to his reorientation of Habsburg diplomacy, Aerenthal began a 
series of reforms within the diplomatic service itself in order to try and bring it  
more into line with the contemporary practices of the other Great Powers of 
Europe.  Primary among these was the recognition that 20th century diplomacy 
should incorporate the economic and industrial concerns of the state and its 
citizens, in addition to the more traditional aspects of personal diplomacy and 
Realpolitik. In this regard, although an aristocrat himself, Aerenthal sought to 
broaden the recruitment of the foreign service outside of the traditional sphere of 
the aristocracy, and implemented personnel reforms which introduced 
educational and training requirements for the first time. Although these reforms 
did not make an immediate impact, especially on the upper tier of the diplomatic 
service, they did serve to instill a certain modernizing spirit within the lower ranks 
of the diplomatic service. Chief among these was an increasing recognition of 
economics and trade as the engine that drives international relations.32 
The third individual to make his appearance on the scene was General Franz 
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CoŶƌad ǀoŶ HötzeŶdoƌf. In the general shakeup of the upper echelons of Habsburg 
leadership of 1906, it was thought that General Friederich von Beck-Rzikowsky, the 
long serving Chief of the General Staff, ought to be retired. Many people, including 
Conrad himself, thought that the obvious choice to succeed Beck would be 
General Oskar Potioƌek, BeĐk͛s deputy.33 Potiorek had a strong background in 
logistics and strategic planning, which are two of the main functions of a general 
staff. In an attempt to do away with all vestiges of the past, Francis Ferdinand 
championed the candidacy of Conrad, who had no prior experience in staff work, 
logistics or strategy, but who had impressed the Crown Prince with his 
modernizing views and his ability to inspire troops as a regimental and division 
commander on the Italian frontier. As a popular and innovative instructor of 
infantry tactics at the War Academy, Conrad had literally written the book on 
which the modernization of the Habsburg Army was to be based, Die 
Gefechtsausbildung die Infanterie (1907).34   
As aŶ iŶstƌuĐtoƌ aŶd tƌoop ĐoŵŵaŶdeƌ, CoŶƌad͛s ǀieǁs oŶ politics and strategy 
were unknown, and Francis Ferdinand had made his promotion of Conrad based 
solely on his military capabilities and modernizing reputation. Once Conrad 
assumed his duties as Chief of the General Staff, he felt it was his duty to keep his 
sovereign, and the rest of the political-military establishment of the ͚ĐoŵŵoŶ 
ŵoŶarĐhy͛, informed of his views regarding the military implications of every 
foreign and domestic policy.   
Conrad was a committed Social Darwinist, and as such believed that „…the 
recognition of the struggle for existence as the basic principle of all events on this 
earth is the oŶly real aŶd ratioŶal ďasis for poliĐy ŵakiŶg.”35 Conrad viewed the 
role of the army as being able to support the aggressive foreign and domestic 
policies which would revitalize the Monarchy and heal its internal divisions. 
Conrad saw no distinction between military and political issues, which led him to 
take a much more vigorous role in the formation of state policy than was 
commonly accepted from a military figure of his time. CoŶƌad͛s ďasiĐ ǀieǁ of the 
role of the foreign office was that it should endeavor to lay the groundwork for 
wars which the Monarchy could win, and to avoid getting them into wars which 
they would lose.36 Thus, Conrad was in favor of AehƌeŶthal͛s iŵpleŵeŶtatioŶ of aŶ 
aggressive Balkan diplomacy, as he regarded it as the prelude to a preventive war 
against Serbia, and possibly Italy as well, in which Russia would remain neutral.  
Aehrenthal found a willing partner for his proposed Austro-Russian entente in 
the person of Alexander Petrovich Izvolsky, the Russian foreign minister. Also 
appointed to his post in 1906, Izvolsky was equally intent on restoring Russian 
prestige and influence following the disastrous defeat in the Russo-Japanese War, 
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and the resultant unrest that had convulsed the Romanov Empire. To this end, 
Izvolsky desired to achieve the goal that had eluded all Russian foreign ministers 
since the end of the Crimean War; that being the opening of the Turkish Straits to 
Russian warships.37 Aehrenthal and Izvolsky recognized that both the Bosnian 
annexation and the opening of the straits could only be done following proper 
diplomatic preparations, as the status of both territories were guaranteed under 
the 1878 Treaty of Berlin, to which all the Great Powers had been signatories.   
On September 16, 1908, the two foreign ministers met at the Moravian villa of 
Buchlau to discuss matters. There was some agreement that was reached between the 
two, but the exact nature and timing of the particulars has been a source of 
speculation, since there were no records kept and no documents signed. Many 
historians have come to accept that there was a definite quid pro quo regarding 
Russian support for the annexation in return for Austro-Hungarian support for the 
Russian demands on the straits, but there seems to be a disagreement over the timing 
of the announcements. Aehrenthal wanted to announce the annexation in early 
October, while Izvolsky wanted to wait until the end of the month, after he had had 
time to lay the groundwork with the foreign ministers of the other Great Powers.38  
Whether Aehrenthal intended on double-crossing Izvolsky from the beginning or 
whether events just spiraled out of control is also debatable. It seems that the former 
idea would be unlikely, as Aehrenthal had a complete restructuring of the diplomatic 
landscape in mind, one which would require amicable relations with St. Petersburg.  
However, Conrad later claimed that Aehrenthal had confided that the ultimate aim of 
his policy was not just the annexation of Bosnia, but the incorporation of all the non-
Bulgarian parts of Serbia within the Monarchy, with the Bulgarian parts going to that 
state.39 Theƌe aƌe soŵe histoƌiaŶs ǁho haǀe asseƌted that Aehƌethal͛s ultiŵate aiŵ 
was for the complete destruction of Serbia, as a prelude to a solution of the South Slav 
question as an internal Habsburg reorientation.40   
In any event, the Young Turk coup d͛état in the Ottoman Empire forced 
Aehrenthal to announce the annexation earlier than planned, as he was afraid that 
the Turks would call for elections to be held in Bosnia and Herzegovina to send 
representatives to the new parliament, thereby weakening Habsburg claims on the 
provinces.  For his part, Izvolsky underestimated both the willingness of ‘ussia͛s 
Entente partners, France and England, to countenance the opening of the straits, 
and, more importantly, the sentiment within Romanov circles to acquiesce to 
Habsburg penetration into the Balkans. The Serbs were completely opposed to the 
annexation, as was anticipated, but the Tsar and a good part of his cabinet were 
similarly adamant about preserving pan-Slav unity.   
Caught out in his secret diplomacy, Izvolsky attempted to bluff his way out of 
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the situation, which encouraged the Serbs to take a more warlike stance. Izvolsky 
tried to get the matter decided by an international conference, but Aehrenthal, 
backed enthusiastically by Conrad, refused arbitration, and attempted to impose a 
unilateral Habsburg conclusion to the event. In this he was largely successful as 
Germany declined to ask for a conference, thereby relegating the affair to a strictly 
Habsburg-Romanov dispute. Izvolsky, and the rest of the Russian political 
establishment, was forced to come to the conclusion that Russia was not strong 
enough, either militarily or politically, to force the issue.   
This would seem to have been the close of the affair, but the Serbian 
nationalists still held out against the inevitable. They mobilized the army, and 
increased political agitation among Bosnian Serbs through the nationalist 
organization Narodna Odbrana (National Defense).41 Conrad had been allowed to 
mobilize part of the k.u.k. Armee in response to the Serbian measures, but was 
restrained by Aehrenthal and Francis Ferdinand from launching his long desired 
attack. The Serbs were eventually talked into facing the reality of the situation, 
and backed down after Aehrenthal offered a sop to them by agreeing to withdraw 
from the Turkish province of Novi-Bazzar, which they had occupied since 1878.   
Francis Joseph and Francis Ferdinand were both pleased with the peaceful 
outcome, and Aehrenthal got the chance to bask in the acknowledgement of his 
diplomatic prowess. Conrad, on the other hand, was absolutely livid, and believed 
that Aehrenthal had played a double game with him, as well as with Izvolsky. This 
served to permanently poison their relationship, and Conrad continued to 
advocate for a military solution to the South Slav question.42 
The fallout from the Bosnian Crisis would have profound effects on the future 
direction of events on the road to Sarajevo.  Although Aehrenthal had restored the 
luster to Habsburg power, he had succeeded in completely alienating Russia in the 
pƌoĐess, aŶd eŶflaŵed Seƌď iƌƌedeŶtisŵ eǀeŶ fuƌtheƌ. ‘ussia͛s iŵpoteŶĐe during the 
crisis spurred a massive rearmament program designed to accompany a more 
confrontational diplomatic policy in regards to the Balkans.43  The more radical 
nationalists in Serbia, built around the nucleus of the regicides of 1903,  formed the 
secret society Ujedinjenje ili Smrt (Unification or Death), also known as ͚the BlaĐk 
HaŶd͛, which was dedicated to the expansion of Greater Serb and South Slav 
nationalism through violent means. Although it was not an official organization, the 
Black Hand included in its membership many high placed officials of the Serbian 
military and state apparatus, including the head of Serbian military intelligence, 
Colonel Dragutin Dimitrijevic, and embarked on a program of sabotage, 
assassination and intimidation in the South Slav territories of the Monarchy.  
Within the Monarchy, the expected positive results of the new assertive 
diplomacy failed to take root, and Conrad became ever more convinced that they 
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had missed a golden opportunity to strike down the Serbian threat while Russia 
was unable to intervene. He became an even more inveterate advocate of war, 
goiŶg oǀeƌ AehƌeŶthal͛s head directly to Francis Joseph in order to advocate an 
attack on their erstwhile ally Italy while they were involved in war with the 
Ottoman Empire over Libya in 1911, which led to his temporary dismissal as Chief 
of the General Staff. Aehrenthal was removed from the scene in 1912, as he was 
diagnosed with leukemia and retired from public life. His replacement, Count 
Leopold Berchtold, was more susceptible to CoŶƌad͛s aƌguŵeŶts, but Francis 
Ferdinand and Francis Joseph managed to keep a reinstated Conrad from 
unleashing his war during the diplomatic crisis surrounding the Balkan Wars of 
1912-1913, although it was a close run affair. 
Finally, Francis Ferdinand met his end in Sarajevo on 28 July, 1914, at the hand 
of an assassin armed and trained by Colonel Dimitrijevic and the Black Hand. With 
the elimination of Francis Ferdinand, the last advocate of a peaceful approach to 
the South Slav question was removed from the councils of the Monarchy, and 
Conrad was able to impress both Berchtold and Francis Joseph that the time had 
come to settle the account, before the balance of power swung too far away from 
the Monarchy. Conrad got his war at last, but the Monarchy was not to survive it. 
It is perhaps ironic that the death of the man who had been the most steadfast 
advocate of a peaceful solution to the MoŶaƌĐhǇ͛s pƌoďleŵs ďeĐaŵe the pƌeteǆt 
for a war which he had done all in his power to avoid.  
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